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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals of Utah has appellate jurisdiction over cases 
transferred to the Court of Appeals form the Supreme Court, Utah Code 7 8-2a-
3(2)Q(2002 & Supp. 2007). The Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah 
Court of Appeals on January 30, 2007. (Record on Appeal (hereinafter "R.") 1513 
-1515; 1527). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs5 claims against 
Appellees, Dennis Bench, Brent Bodily, Adam Christofferson, Craig 
Christofferson, Robert Eames, Devin Ellis, Mickey Ellis, Jerry Fulmer, Jimmie 
Germer, Dale Hammon, Scott Hammon, Mike Howell, Brent Keyes, Ray Page, 
Don Palfreyman, Dave Squires, Greg Warg, Robert "Mac" White, Bruce Woolsey, 
Ryan Woolsey, BJ. Burkdoll, Jim Burkdoll, Gary McDaniel, Jim Vowles, John 
Elwess, Bill New and Scott New (hereinafter "Stags Car Club members"), pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), by finding that Plaintiffs did not state a claim upon 
which relief could have been granted because Plaintiffs failed to plead that the 
Stags Car Club members acted in furtherance of the tort that harmed 
PlaintiffAjppellant, Sharon Williams? 
Standard of Review: The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a 
question of law and the district court's ruling is entitled to no deference. The 
1 
decision is reviewed under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Development Co. 
v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Anderson Development 
Co., L.C. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36,167, 116 P.3d 323, 341 (Utah 2005). 
Citation to the Record: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and 
arguing the same in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jim Burkdoll, 
Devin Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, Jim 
Vowles, Jimmie Germer, Brent Bodily, Adam Christofferson, Craig 
Christofferson, Jack Harris, Bruno Perry, Ryan Woolsey, and John Elwess' 
Motions to Dismiss (R. 614 - 626) and November 1, 2006 Oral Argument (R. 
1364). 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court err in considering matters outside the 
pleadings in determining the motion to dismiss without affording 
Plaintiffs/Appellants a reasonable opportunity to discover and present all pertinent 
material? 
Standard of Review: The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a 
question of law and the district court's ruling is entitled to no deference. The 
decision is reviewed under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Development Co. 
v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Anderson Development 
Co., L.C. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, \ 67, 116 P.3d 323, 341 (Utah 2005); Strand v. 
Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977)(holding 
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that it is error to consider a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, 
without giving the adverse party an opportunity to present pertinent material). 
Citation to the Record: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and 
arguing the same in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jim Burkdoll, 
Devin Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, Jim 
Vowles, Jimmie Germer, Brent Bodily, Adam Christofferson, Craig 
Christofferson, Jack Harris, Bruno Perry, Ryan Woolsey, and John Elwess' 
Motions to Dismiss (R. 614 - 626) and November 1, 2006 Oral Argument (R. 
1364). 
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the trial court err in dismissing the complaint with 
prejudice and denying Appellants leave to amend the complaint? 
Standard of Review: The applicable standard of review is abuse of 
discretion. Neztsosie v. Meyer, 833 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 1994); Holmes Dev., LLC 
v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, f 56, 48 P.3d 895 (Utah 2002). 
Citation to the Record: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and 
arguing the same in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Jim Burkdoll, 
Devin Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, Jim 
Vowles, Jimmie Germer, Brent Bodily, Adam Christofferson, Craig 
Christofferson, Jack Harris, Bruno Perry, Ryan Woolsey, and John Elwess' 
3 
Motions to Dismiss (R. 614 - 626) and November 1, 2006 Oral Argument (R. 
1364). 
ISSUE NO. 4: Did the trial court err in certifying its Order of dismissal as a 
final judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) without making any findings of 
fact supporting the court's decision? 
Standard of Review: The propriety of a Rule 54(b) certification is a 
question of law and the district court's ruling is entitled to no deference. The 
decision is reviewed under a correctness standard. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State 
Tax Com'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991), citing Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 
692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). 
Citation to the Record: Appellants preserved this issue by raising and 
arguing the same in Plaintiffs' letter to the court with accompanying proposed 
order (R. 1365), Notice of Objection to Defendants Rule 54(b) Motion for Final 
Judgment (R. 1407 - 1410), and Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to Defendants 
Proposed Findings and Rationale for Certifying Order Dismissing Individual 
Defendants as Final per Rule 54(b). (R. 1489 - 1492). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND RULES 
The following rules and statutes interpretation are determinative or are of 
central importance of the appeal: 
Exhibit 1: Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
Exhibit 2: UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 48-1-10 
Exhibit 3: UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 48-1-12 
Exhibit 4: Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
Exhibit 5: Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
Exhibit 6: Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Exhibit 7: Excerpts of Transcript of Motion to Dismiss November 1, 2006 (R. 
1364, pp. 27, 33, 34, 35). 
Exhibit 8: Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Final Judgment 
Pursuant to Rule 54(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: The Appellants, ShaRon and Lynn Williams, 
brought a personal injury lawsuit against Ralph Wiggins, Stags Car Club, and 
Stags Car Club's individual members, arising from severe personal injuries 
suffered by ShaRon Williams when she was struck by a truck driven by Ralph 
Wiggins when she was a guest at an event conducted by the Stags Car Club. (R. 
001 - 010; 090 - 099). The Williams' alleged negligence by all defendants and 
5 
vicarious liability against Stags Car Club and its individual members. (R. 001 -
010; 090-099). 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW: The Williams' filed 
their Complaint and Jury Demand against Stags Car Club, a Voluntary 
Unincorporated Association; Ralph Wiggins; and John Does 1-100 on January 17, 
2006. (R. 001-010). In response, Ralph Wiggins and Stags Car Club answered 
the Complaint on February 15, 2006 and February 22, 2007, respectively. (R. 023 
-028 ; 029-037). 
On May 4, 2007, the Williams' filed an Amended Complaint naming 
individual members of the Stags Car Club. (R. 090 - 099). In response, on July 
12, 2006, Defendants Jim Burkdoll, Devin Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, 
Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, and Jim Vowles filed a Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter 
"Defendants' Jim Burkdoll, et al, Motion to Dismiss"). (R. 334 - 336). On July 
14, 2006, Defendant Jimmie Germer filed a joinder in Defendants' Jim Burkdoll, et 
al., Motion to Dismiss. (R. 390 - 392). On July 18, 2006, Defendants Adam 
Christofferson, Craig Christofferson, Jack Harris, Bruno Perry, Ryan Woolsey, and 
John Elwess filed a Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum incorporating 
by reference "the same factual recitations and legal arguments submitted in the 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Defendants Jim Burkdoll, Devin 
Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, and Jim 
6 
Vowles (dated July 11, 2006)." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Defendants Adam Christofferson, Craig Christofferson, Jack Harris, Bruno Perry, 
Ryan Woolsey, and John Elwess. (R. 409 - 411; 412 - 414). Also on July 18, 
2006, Defendant Brent G. Bodily filed his joinder to the motion to dismiss. (R. 415 
-418). 
On August 1, 2006, the Williams' filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
motions to dismiss and joinders thereto. (R. 614 - 626). The Williams' opposition 
was followed by the individual members of Stags Car Club's reply memoranda and 
additional joinders to the motion. (R. 651 - 658; 701 - 703; 704 - 713; 724 - 726; 
727 - 741; 747 - 750; 751 - 755; 805 - 807). On November 1, 2006, the Court, the 
Honorable Ernest W. Jones presiding, heard oral arguments and issued an order 
granting the individual Stags Car Club's members motion to dismiss with prejudice 
and denied Appellant's request for leave to amend. (R. 1364). 
In response to Stags Car Club members' presented proposed order that 
included not only a grant of the motion to dismiss with prejudice but also 
certifying the order under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), Appellants, on 
November 20, 2006, noted their objections to the certification and offered their 
own proposed order excluding the 54(b) certification language. (R. 1365). In 
response, on November 28, 2006, individual Stags Car Club members, Greg Warg 
and B.J. Burkdoll filed a Rule 54(b) Motion for Final Judgment requesting the 
7 
certification of the dismissal order. (R. 848 - 850). On November 30, 2006, the 
Court signed the Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Final 
Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) and filed the same on December 6, 2006. (R. 
1366-1370). 
On December 14, 2007, the Williams filed Plaintiffs' Notice of Objection to 
Defendants' Rule 54(b) Motion for Final Judgment on the grounds that 
certification had not been requested by the individual Stags Car Club members at 
the time the Court issued the order and that it had not been properly briefed or 
argued. (R. 1407 - 1410). Additionally, the Williams' objected to the motion as 
moot since the Court had previously entered its Order Granting Defendants Motion 
to Dismiss and Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) on November 30, 2006. (R. 
1407 - 1410). Thereafter, additional joinders to the Rule 54(b) Motion for Final 
Judgment, reply memoranda, and a [Proposed] Findings and Rationale for 
Certifying Order Dismissing Individual Defendants as Final Per Rule 54(b) were 
filed with the Court. (R. 1411 - 1414; 1438 - 1459). 
Again, on December 21, 2006, the Williams' stated their objections to the 
Rule 54(b) certification and further objected to the [Proposed] Findings and 
Rational for Certifying Order Dismissing Individual Defendants as Final per Rule 
54(b). (R. 1489 - 1492). On January 17, 2007, the Court entered the Stags Car 
Club's members proposed Findings and Rationale for Certifying Order Dismissing 
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Individual Defendants as Final per Rule 54(b)—more than forty-five days after the 
November 30, 2006 dismissal order and nineteen days after the Williams' filed 
their Notice of Appeal (R. 8 7 8 - 881; 1521 - 1526). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: On September 12, 2004, Stags Car Club—an 
unincorporated association—and its members conducted, managed, and oversaw a 
club-sponsored "steak fry" event at George Whalen Park, Roy City, Utah. (R. 090 
- 099, THf 2, 4, 7, 13, 27). The "steak fry" event was conducted "[f]or entertaining 
club members and their invitees." (R. 092, f 7). ShaRon Williams "[w]as an 
invitee" at the "steak fry" event. (R. 092, f 9). 
Shortly after arriving to the park with her husband Lynn Williams, ShaRon 
Williams lay down on the grass between two trees and fell asleep. (R. 092 Ifll 8 -
10). Ralph S. Wiggins, who was then a member and the elected Secretary of Stags 
Car Club, got in his pick-up truck to go get beverages for club members, and ran 
over Ms. Williams as she lay sleeping in the grass. (R. 092 - 096, fflf 11 - 12; 22 -
24). When Mr. Wiggins ran over Ms. Williams, he was "[a]cting within the course 
and scope of his duties" and for "[t]he purpose of serving the Stags Car Club 
interest" as a Stags Car Club member, officer, and nominee performing duties of 
the general kind within the scope of Stags Car Club's activities, "[including 
without limitation arranging, making provisions for, and conducting the event. . . 
." (R. 092 - 096, ffif 11 - 12, 22 - 24). Mr. Wiggins ran over Ms. Williams on his 
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way to get a cooler for use and benefit by the Stags Car Club and its members in 
conducting the event." (R. 092 - 093,1ffl 11 - 12). 
On May 4, 2006, Appellants' named the individual members of the Stags 
Car Club 
As a result of all named Defendants' negligence, including Mr. Wiggins 
running her over as she lay on the grass and the Stags Car Club's members failure 
to exercise a reasonable lookout and reasonable care for persons present at and 
participating in the event in which they conducted, managed, and oversaw, Ms. 
Williams suffered permanent and disabling injuries and other damages. (R. 090 -
099, Iffl 13-30). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court erred when it granted the Stags Car Club's members 
Motion to Dismiss with prejudice because the Williams' complaint did, as a matter 
of law, state claims upon which relief could have been granted. As members of an 
unincorporated association, the Stags Car Club members are directly liable for 
their own negligence in conducting, managing, and overseeing an unsafe event and 
they are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the fellow members of their 
unincorporated association. 
Additionally, any order should have been entered without prejudice and the 
Williams' should have been granted leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15, Utah 
10 
Rule of Civil Procedure; as justice requires the Williams' be permitted the 
opportunity to sufficiently set forth allegations that, if proven, allow recovery 
against individual members of an unincorporated association. Moreover, the 
district court erred when it certified the dismissal under Rule 54(b) without making 
the necessary and proper findings and rationale prior to certifying the order as 
required under Utah law. 
ARGUMENT 
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
should only be affirmed if it appears to a certainty that Plaintiffs would not be 
entitled to relief under any state of facts, which could be proved in support of its 
claims. Educators Mutual Insurance Association v. Allied Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company, 890 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah 1995)(quoting Prows v. State, 822 
P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991) and Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 
(Utah 1989)(emphasis added). Accepting all of Appellants' allegations as admitted 
facts and drawing all inferences of those facts in the light favorable to them, the 
Williams9 have stated claims for relief against Stags Car Club's members. Medved 
v. Glenn, 2005 UT 77, If 8, 125 P.3d 913, 915 (Utah 2005), quoting Riddle v. 
Perry, 2002 UT 10, f 2, 40 P.3d 1128, 1130 - 1131 (Utah 2002); Anderson 
Development Co., L.C., 2005 UT 36, t 53, 116 P.3d 323, 338 (Utah 2005), quoting 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co,, 2002 UT 69, f 38, 54 P. 3d 1054, 1065 
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(Utah 2002)("In reviewing a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss . 
. . 'we accept the factual allegations in the [complaint] as true and consider them, 
and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party.'"). 
L SHARON AND LYNN WILLIAMS STATED CLAIMS UPON 
WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED AGAINST THE 
INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE STAGS CAR CLUB. 
On November 30, 2006, the Trial Court, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissed with prejudice claims of direct and vicarious 
liability against the "defendants who are club members, except Ralph Wiggins" on 
the grounds that the Williams' "failed to plead that these members acted in 
furtherance of the tort which harmed plaintiff." (R. 1366 - 1370). Dismissal by the 
District Court was error. 
As an unincorporated association, Stags Car Club and its members are duty 
bound to use the same care to avoid injury to others as are individual, natural 
persons. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d)(2007); Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527, 
534 (Me. 1973). Accordingly, under certain circumstances, the unincorporated 
association and its members could be held directly and/or vicariously liable for the 
torts committed against nonmembers. Id; Rudolph v. Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation, 
898 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Guyton v. Howard, 525 So.2d 948, 957 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Libby, 311 A.2d at 534; Boehm v. Cody Chamber of 
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Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 708 (Wyo. 1987); Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 
1029, 1034 (Utah 1987); Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, n.l (Utah 1984). 
The Complaint and Jury Demand and subsequent Amended Complaint 
sufficiently alleged two distinct claims of direct and vicarious liability against 
individual member defendants for their injuries. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) (stating that 
the only requirements of a complaint are that it contain a "short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and "a demand for 
judgment for the relief. . . .") ; (R. 001 - 010; 090 - 099). 
a. APPELLANTS SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE 
AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE STAGS CAR CLUB AS 
PERSONS CONDUCTING, MANAGING, AND OVERSEEING THE CLUB-
SPONSORED EVENT. 
To establish a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must establish (1) that the 
defendant(s) owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached the duty, (3) 
that the breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4) 
that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries or damages. Interwest Const v. Palmer, 
923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996). A duty of care arises when the defendant(s) is 
under any obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff. Webb v. University of 
Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah 2005)(quoting Delbridge v. Maricopa County 
Cmty. Coll Dist, 893 P.2d 55, 58 (1994))(internal quotation omitted). 
"Determining whether a party has an affirmative duty to protect another . . . 
requires a careful consideration of the consequences for the parties and society at 
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large." Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986). The Utah 
Supreme Court has "consistently taken 'a policy-based approach' in determining 
whether a special relation should be said to exist and consequently whether a duty 
is owed." Diysdale v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1, 3 (\994)(quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1993). 
Utah precedent generally applies the "special relation" analysis afforded by 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, applying a factor-based analysis to determine 
whether there exists a duty. Diysdale, 869 P.2d at 3. Factors include: (1) "the 
identity and character of the actor," (2) "the victim and the victimizer," (3) "the 
relationship of the actor to the victim and the victimizer," and (4) "the practical 
impact that finding a special relationship would have." Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237. 
Appellants' have alleged, and, for purposes of this appeal, the Court must 
accept as true, the allegations of the complaint, to-wit: ShaRon Williams' was an 
invitee to the event sponsored and conducted by the Stags Car Club and its 
members. (R. 092 - 096, ffif 7 - 9, 13, 27); Stags Car Club is and at all times 
relevant to the complaint was "an unincorporated association doing business in the 
State of the Utah"; and the event at issue was hosted, conducted, managed, and 
overseen by Stags Car Club and its individual members. (R. 091 - 096, ^f 2, 7, 13, 
27); that, "as members of Defendant Stags Car Club and as members conducting, 
managing and overseeing" the event at which ShaRon Williams was injured, Stags 
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Car Club members undertook the duty to organize and conduct the event in a 
reasonably safe manner, "including . . . to exercise a reasonable lookout and 
reasonable care for persons present at and participating in the event." (R. 096, f 
27). 
The Williams further alleged that Defendants, in obtaining possession of the 
premises for the period during which the event was conducted, undertaking the 
event at issue, and inviting the Williams' to participate, created a special 
relationship and assumed a duty of reasonable care for the protection of their 
invitees, including Ms. Williams, as persons present at and participating in the 
event. (R. 092 - 096, f t 7, 9, 13, 27). Stags Car Club members breached their duty 
of care in conducting, managing, and overseeing an unsafe event and by failing to 
"observ[e] the movement of vehicles at the event and to warn persons of the 
presence of moving motor vehicles." (R. 093 - 097, If 13, 19 - 20, 27 - 28). 
Individual Stags Car Club members' active sponsorship and participation in 
the event, including "conducting, managing, and overseeing" the event imposes 
direct liability for such acts and omissions in breach of their duty. See Rudolph v. 
Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation, 898 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding 
that sponsors of an event owe a duty to use reasonable care in designing and 
conducting their event to prevent others from being injured.). Guyton v. Howard, 
525 So.2d 948, 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)(holding that members of an 
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unincorporated association may be liable if found that he [or she] "committed or 
participated in a tortious act or failure to act, or authorized, assented to or ratified 
such an act or failure to act . . . or set in motion the proceedings or agreed to the 
course of action which culminated in the foreseeable conduct which caused . . . 
injuries [to a third party]); Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527, 534 (Me. 1973) (holding 
liability attached to members of an unincorporated association who are shown to 
have actively participated in the affair resulting in plaintiffs injuries). 
Finally, Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the Defendants' negligent acts 
and/or omissions, Plaintiffs have suffered damages including, but not limited to, 
past medical expenses, lost wages and earning capacity, past general damages 
including "pain, suffering, emotional distress and any loss of use amounting to a 
permanent disability," and "for such other relief as is appropriate and proper under 
the circumstances." (R 090 - 099). Because the purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish 
the facts or resolve the merits of a case . . . [ , ] dismissal is justified only when the 
allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a 
claim." Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 
1996). Here, Appellants plead all of the elements of negligent misconduct under 
Utah law. 
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b. APPELLANTS HAVE STATED A CLAIM FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF STAGS CAR 
CLUB, AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION. 
The Williams alleged, as an alternative claim, that, by virtue of their status 
as members and as recipients of the privileges and benefits of membership of the 
unincorporated association, the individual member Defendants are vicariously 
liable for the negligent acts of other members of the unincorporated association 
and for the injuries and damages that result therefrom. (R. 091 - 099). These 
allegations are sufficient to survive the Stags Car Club members' Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss. 
The precise question of whether members of an unincorporated association 
are liable for the negligent acts of other members has not been directly addressed 
by Utah courts. However, other jurisdictions have addressed this issue and found 
that vicarious liability attaches. 
Unincorporated associations that have operations related directly to the 
interests of the membership, and has members actively involved in its operation 
and management, resemble a partnership and are thus subject to the same rules 
applicable to partnerships. City of Kalamazoo v. Michigan Disposal Serv. Corp., 
125 F.Supp.2d 219, 236 (W.D. Mich. 2000); Benevolent and Protective Order of 
Elks Local 291 v. Mooney, 666 N.E.2d 970 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). This general 
rule rests on the theory that unincorporated associations are joint enterprises or 
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joint ventures and therefore members of the unincorporated association stand in the 
same relationship as partners in a general partnership. Boehm v. Cody Chamber of 
Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 708 (Wyo. 1987) (holding an unincorporated association 
is a joint enterprise and is subject to the same rules as a partnership therefore 
negligence of one member, acting in furtherance of the enterprise, is imputable to 
all); Rogers v. MO. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1987) (joint venturers 
stand in the same relationship as partners, and thus principles governing liability of 
one partner act for the benefit of partnership); Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, n.l 
(Utah 1984)(a joint venture is subject to the same rules as a partnership.); U.C.A. § 
48-1-3.1 (1985). Under Utah Code Annotated Section 48-1-10: 
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the 
ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority 
of his copartners loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a 
partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is 
liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting 
to act. 
U.C.A. § 48-1-10 (1953, as amended 2007). Partners are jointly and severally 
liable "for everything chargeable to the partnership under Sections 48-1-10 and 48-
1-11." U.C.A. § 48-1-12 (1953, as amended 2007). 
Additionally, members of an unincorporated association may be held liable 
for torts committed by other members without personal participation in the 
wrongful act, if the members set the proceedings in motion or agree to a course of 
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action that culminates in the wrongful conduct. Guyton v. Howard, 525 So. 2d 948 
(Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1st Dist. 1988). 
Appellants have alleged that Stags Car Club was and continues to be "[a]n 
unincorporated association doing business in the State of Utah, with its principal 
place of business in Roy, Utah." (R. 091, ^ f 2). In addition, Appellants allege that 
at the time of the events giving rise to this action, Ralph Wiggins, a member and 
officer of Defendant Stags Car Club, was acting within the course and scope of his 
duties as a member and officer of the unincorporated association and that "his 
conduct was motivated, in whole or in part, by the purpose of serving" the interests 
of the unincorporated association. (R. 091 - 098, ffif 3, 11, 22 - 24, 30). 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs have alleged that members of the club "nominated and 
designated Ralph S. Wiggins to perform duties of the general kind and nature 
performed in the scope of Defendant Stags Car Club's activities," including 
arranging, making provisions for, and conducting the event. (R. 095 - 096, <(fl| 23-
24, 26). 
Therefore, accepting as true the allegations in Appellants' complaint, as 
members of the unincorporated association, each member may be jointly and 
severally liable for the wrongful acts of other members acting within authority of 
other co-members or within the ordinary course of the business of Stags Car Club. 
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U.C.A. §§ 48-1-10, 48-1-12 (2006). Clearly, Appellants properly plead a 
cognizable claim of vicarious liability. 
As here, where an unincorporated association exercises the rights and 
powers of a legal entity, it should, to the extent reasonably and legally possible, be 
held to assume corresponding duties and obligations, including member liability. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING MATTERS 
OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS IN DETERMINING THE MOTION 
TO DISMISS WITHOUT AFFORDING APPELLANTS A 
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCOVER AND PRESENT 
ALL PERTINENT MATERIAL. 
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to challenge the formal sufficiency of 
the claim for relief, not to establish facts or resolve the merits of the case. Whipple 
v. American for Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1990)(emphasis added). 
In considering a motion to dismiss the trial courts role "[was to] review only the 
material allegations in [Plaintiffs'] complaint, and not the evidence submitted 
outside of the pleadings." Ho v. Jim's Enters, Inc., 29 P.3d 633, 635 n.5 (Utah 
2001). However, the trial court did not solely focus the material allegations of the 
amended complaint to decide the individual members motion to dismiss, but made 
specific findings of fact, without affording Appellants a reasonable opportunity to 
present all pertinent material as requested or having the benefit of foil discovery, to 
justify its outcome. (R. 1364, at pp. 33 - 35). 
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Specifically, as to direct negligence the Court found, "the only person who 
was really actively involved in committing this tort which is backing over or 
running over . . . [Plaintiff] [was] Mr. Wiggins." (R. 1364, pp. 33: 19 - 24, 34: 16 -
18). The Court further found that defendants were not possessors of land, Ms. 
Williams was not an invitee, but a mere licensee, and that the Court "just [doesn't] 
find that the defendants, these car club members were ever acting in furtherance of 
the tort." (R. 1364, p. 34: 10 - 24). Moreover, without the benefit of discovery or 
affording Appellants the opportunity to present pertinent material, the Court simply 
found that members must "[b]e doing something that led to the injury of Ms. 
Williams, and just belonging to the car club and just paying dues and just bringing 
your steak or potluck or whatever, . . . [is not] enough to impose any kind of 
liability." (R. 1364, p. 35: 7 - 13). 
The trial court further justified dismissal of Plaintiffs vicarious liability 
claims because "it appears to [the Court] that the Skags [sic] Car Club is an 
unincorporated nonprofit social club" and therefore because of its non-profit 
nature, the "individual club members . . . cannot be held liable for the negligence 
of a club member, Mr. Wiggins, simply by virtue of their status as members of the 
club." (R. 1364, p. 33: 19 - 34: 9)(emphasis added). The trial court found that 
Stags Car Club was non-profit because it saw "no indication the club was acting 
for pecuniary gain in this particular case based on what he saw in the briefs." 
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"[T]he briefs" as commented on by the Court presumably included an affidavit and 
other evidence submitted in Defendant Jimmie Germer's Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (dated June 16, 
2006)(R. 114-128), Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Jimmie 
Germer's Motion for Summary Judgment (dated July 6, 2006)(R. 281 -319) , and 
subsequent Reply Memorandum (dated July 10, 2006)(R. 324 - 330). 
For the purposes of this appeal, it is important to note that the Complaint and 
Amended Complaint state that the Stags Car Club is an unincorporated association, 
it makes no designation or pleading of fact that the Stags Car Club is a "nonprofit 
social club." (R. 091, f 2). Neither does the Complaint solely allege individual 
member liability merely upon membership of a "social club." (R. 090 - 099). 
Rather, and more accurately, the Complaint alleges two separate and distinct 
claims of direct and vicarious liability. Specifically that Stags Car Club is and at all 
times relevant to the complaint was "an unincorporated association doing business 
in the State of the Utah" and that the event at issue was hosted, conducted, 
managed, and overseen by Stags Car Club and its individual members. (R. 091 — 
096 , ffif 2, 7, 13, 27). That "as members of Defendant Stags Car Club and as 
members conducting, managing and overseeing" the event at which ShaRon 
Williams was injured, Stags Car Club members undertook the duty to organize and 
conduct the event in a reasonably safe manner, "including . . . to exercise a 
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reasonable lookout and reasonable care for persons present at and participating in 
the event." (R. 096, ffi[ 26 - 27). 
Additionally and alternatively, the Appellants further alleged that at the time 
of the events giving rise to this action, Ralph Wiggins, a member and officer of 
Defendant Stags Car Club, was acting within the course and scope of his duties as 
a member and officer of the unincorporated association and that "his conduct was 
motivated, in whole or in part, by the purpose of serving" the interests of the 
unincorporated association and its members; that members of the club "nominated 
and designated Ralph S. Wiggins to perform duties of the general kind and nature 
performed in the scope of Defendant Stags Car Club's activities," including 
arranging, making provisions for, and conducting the event; and "[b]y virtue of 
their status as members of the unincorporated association, Defendant Stags Car 
Club, and as recipients of the privileges and benefits of membership of Defendant 
Stags Car Club, including without limitation the specific even described above, . . . 
are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of other members of the unincorporated 
association and for the injuries and damages that result there from. (R. 095 - 096, 
1H 23-24, 30). 
When affidavits or other evidence are presented in support of a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted—as in the 
instant case— and the court does not exclude them, the motion is converted into a 
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motion for summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b); Utah R. Civ. P. 56. Once 
the trial court considered materials outside the pleadings, all parties must be given 
adequate notice and opportunity to submit supporting materials. Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(emphasis added). 
Appellants specifically requested the Court to provide such notice and allow 
an opportunity to conduct further discovery so they may adequately and justly 
present supporting materials for their allegations. (R. 614 - 626). However, the 
Court failed to allow Appellants this opportunity and rejected their specific request 
to do so pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 614 - 626). The 
action of the District Court in denying the Williams' notice and the reasonable 
opportunity to present controverting material violated the mandate of Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977)(holding that it is error to consider a motion to dismiss 
as a motion for summary judgment, without giving the adverse party an 
opportunity to present pertinent material). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING APPELLANTS 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT. 
If the Complaint was deficient—which the Appellants do not believe or 
concede—the Williams' should have been provided the opportunity to amend the 
Complaint to adequately plead that the individual members acted in furtherance of 
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the tort that harmed Ms. Williams. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15, in pertinent part, states: 
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any 
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it any time within 20 
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only 
be leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave 
shall be freely when justice so requires. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
In the instant matter, Stags Car Club members9 motions to dismiss are not 
responsive pleadings that would preclude the Williams' from exercising their right 
to amend the complaint "once as a matter of course." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a); 
Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon, 110 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Moreover, it is a general rule in Utah that dismissal under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) is not final or on the merits and the court normally will give 
plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Alvarez v. Galetcka, 933 P.2d 987, 
991 (Utah 1997). Indeed, the only occasion where a trial court should usurp a 
Plaintiffs request to amend afforded by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) is 
when "[i]t appears to a certainty that plaintiff cannot state a claim." Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). 
As stated above, liability of the individual Stags Car Club members is 
predicated upon both their direct liability as individuals conducting, managing, and 
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overseeing the event and vicarious liability as members of an unincorporated 
association. (R. 090 - 099). The individual members only challenge to the 
sufficiency of the Williams' complaint is the alleged absence of specific acts by the 
members that were in furtherance of Ms. Williams being run over while attending 
their member-sponsored, member-conducted, and member-managed event. 
The individual members position, however, only furthers the Williams' 
contention that the causes of actions as plead by the Williams' are proper and that 
the only fault, if any, was presenting the allegation that the members in negligently 
organizing, conducting, and maintaining an unsafe event including maintaining a 
reasonable lookout and reasonable care for persons present at and participating in 
the event furthered or contributed to Mr. Wiggins running over Ms. Williams as 
she lay sleeping in the grass between the trees. (R. 1366 - 1370). Accordingly, 
Appellants' should have been afforded the opportunity to file a motion to amend 
the Complaint as requested. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a); (R. 614 - 626; 1364 at p. 27). 
The District Court erred when it dismissed with prejudice Appellants' direct 
and vicarious liability claims against the individual members of the Stags Car 
Club. Educators Mutual Insurance Association v. Allied Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company, 890 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah \995)(quotingProws v. State, 822 
P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991) and Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 
(Utah 1989). The appropriate remedy for a Rule 12(b)(6) violation is dismissal 
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without prejudice with leave to file a proper motion to amend or leave to amend. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a); Alvarez v. Galetcka, 933 P.2d at 991. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CERTIFYING THE 
DISMISSAL AS A FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER UTAH R. CIV. P. 
54(B). 
The district court erred when it certified the dismissal as final under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) without making the necessary and proper findings 
under Utah law. (R. 1366 - 1370). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) states in 
pertinent part: 
Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether 
as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, and/or 
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a 
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is 
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of 
judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
Utah law interpreting Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) states that three (3) 
requirements must be satisfied prior to the entry of final judgment: (1) "[t]here 
must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the action"; (2) [t]he 
judgment appealed from must have been entered on an order that would be 
appealable but for the fact that other claims or parties remain in the action"; and (3) 
"[t]he trial court, in its discretion, must make a determination that 'there is no just 
reason for delay' of the appeal." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 814 
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P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991) quoting 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civ. 2d § 2656, at 47 - 48 (1983). Generally, 
certification should be precluded where there is significant "factual overlap" 
between the operative facts of the certified and unlitigated claims. Bennion v. 
Pennzoil Company, 826 P.2d 137, 137 (Utah 1992). 
Additionally, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires that the trial court 
"find the facts specially" in all actions by the court and in interlocutory orders. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Bennion, 826 P.2d at 139. Accordingly, to properly certify 
an order under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) a simple incantation of the 
words of certification is insufficient. Bennion, 826 P.2d at 139. The order must 
contain findings supporting the conclusion that such orders are final and a rationale 
explaining why there was no just reason for delay, including findings regarding the 
lack of factual overlap between the certified and remaining claims. Bennion, 826 
P.2datl39. 
In the instant case, the district court failed to make a proper determination 
and enumeration of findings or rationale. (R. 1366 - 1370). Although the District 
Court signed a proposed order that included findings and rationale for Rule 54(b) 
certification of the dismissal order, it was done only after the Order Granting 
Defendants Motion to Dismiss and Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) was 
entered, without affording the Williams' the opportunity to fully brief the matter 
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when requested, and without proper jurisdiction. (R. 1365; 1366 - 1370; 1521 -
1526); U.C.A. 78-2a-3(2); Utah R. App. P. 3. Indeed, the [Proposed] Findings and 
Rationale for Certifying Order Dismissing Individual Defendants as Final per Rule 
54(b) was entered forty-eight days after the dismissal and certification order had 
been signed and nineteen (19) days after the Notice of Appeal was filed. (R. 878 -
881; 1366-1370; 1521-1526). 
Without making the proper determination, findings of fact, and rationale, the 
district court erred when it certified the dismissal as final under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b) under Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred when it granted the Stags Car Club's members 
Motion to Dismiss with prejudice because the Williams9 pleadings stated claims 
upon which relief could have been granted. As members of an unincorporated 
association, the individual defendants are directly liable for their own negligence in 
conducting, managing, and overseeing an unsafe event, and as members of the 
unincorporated association they are vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their 
fellow member. 
Additionally, the Stags Car Club's members should have been dismissed, if 
at all, without prejudice and the Williams' should have been granted leave to 
amend pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15 to sufficiently set forth the 
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allegations, if proven, that allow recovery against individual members of an 
unincorporated association. Moreover, the district court erred when it certified the 
dismissal under Rule 54(b) without making the necessary and proper findings and 
rationale prior to certifying the order as required under Utah law. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 
C West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
* ! 
Part III, Pleadings, Motions, and Orders 
RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a 
defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the summons 
and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after service of 
the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within twenty days 
after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in the 
answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by 
the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order 
otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of 
time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a 
motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the 
time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on 
the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice of 
the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite 
statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) 
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure 
to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made 
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is 
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waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such 
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the 
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may 
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a 
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be 
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a 
motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within 
such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the 
pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the 
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all 
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and 
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that 
the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be 
required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite 
statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the 
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the 
order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of the order or 
within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to 
which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading 
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a 
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court may order 
stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join 
with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes 
a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and objections 
then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not 
thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, 
except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented 
either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an 
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for 
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judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after 
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver 
of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action 
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a 
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which may 
be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of 
the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a 
$300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such costs 
and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be required 
of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall, 
upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
[Amended effective September 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.] 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Complaint, motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, see Rules Civ. 
Proc., Form 10. 
Insurance, additional time to answer, see § 31A-2-310. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Parties ^"^ 77 to 
Pleading w 78, 85, 150, 342, 351 to 361, 367. 
Pretrial Procedure ^ W ~ ^ ~
 556^ 561^ 6 2 1 t o 6 29. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 302k78; 302k85; 302kl50; 302k342; 302k351 to 
302k361; 302k367; 287k77 to 287k81; 307Ak556; 307Ak561; 307Ak621 to 
307Ak629. 
C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 142. 
C.J.S. Dismissal and Nonsuit §§ 52 to _53_, j^ 2, J54 to 66. 
C.J.S. Parties §§ 197 to 211. 
C.J.S. Pleading §§ 160 to IQ, 1_6_8 to 17_0, £04, 5>6_4 to 5_65, 5_9_4 to 6>_92, _694 to 
695, 710 to 12A, 121_ to 762. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
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U.C.A. 1953 §48-1-10 
c West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 48. Partnership 
*ra 
Chapter 1. General and Limited Liability Partnerships (Refs & Annos) 
— ^ ™ Part 1. General Partnership 
§ 48-1-10. Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act 
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course 
of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his copartners loss or 
injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any 
penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the 
partner so acting or omitting to act. 
Laws 1921, c. 89, § 13. 
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 69-1-10; C. 1943, § 69-1-10. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Uniform Law 
This section is similar to § 13 of the Uniform Partnership Act (1914) . See Volume 
6, Pt. I Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Partnership -^^  153. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 289kl53. 
C.J.S. Partnership § 168. 
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RESEARCH REFERENCES 
ALR Library 
115 A.L.R. 1362, Constitutionality, Construction, and Application of Statutes Which 
Forbid or Otherwise Regulate Compensation for Organizing Corporation, Procuring 
Subscription for Stock, or Selling Its Securities. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
In general 1. 
Evidence of joint venture £ 
Fraud 3^  
1_. In general 
Joint venturers stand in same relationship to each other as partners, and thus 
principles governing liability of one partner for fraudulent assignment of 
partnership assets for benefit of partnership apply. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-10. Rogers 
v. M.O. Bitner Co., 1987, 738 P.2d 1029. Joint Adventures ^** 1; Joint €==? 
€ ^ 7 Adventures 
2_. Evidence of joint venture 
Real estate agentTs receipt of $2,000 from general contractor was a share of the 
profits and was prima facie evidence that he was a joint venturer; owners 
testified that agent told them he was general contractor's partner, had met with 
them and general contractor several times and had gone beyond normally expected 
real estate agent activities by assisting with ordering of materials for job site. 
U.C.A.1953, 48-1-3.1, 48-1-10 to 48-1-12. Hoth v. White, 1990, 799 P.2d 213. 
Joint Adventures 
3. Fraud 
€=»,.„ 
In derivative action by stockholder of life insurance company against directors, 
who allegedly caused company to issue capital stock to themselves without company 
receiving anything of value, to recover market value of stock, liability of 
directors was joint and several, rather than several and not joint, where right of 
recovery was based primarily on fraud of directors in acting both as directors and 
members of partnership, which organized the company, and which received stock from 
company, and which distributed stock to directors. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-10, 48-1-12. 
Bergeson v. Life Ins Corp of America, 1958, 170 F.Supp. 150, affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 Qz? 
L.Ed.2d 1545. Insurance ^-^ 1151 
U.C.A. 1953 § 48-1-10, UT ST § 48-1-10 
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Current through 2007 First Special Session including laws passed at the 
2007 November General election. 
Copr © 2007 Thomson/West 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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U.C.A. 1953 §48-1-12 
c West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 48. Partnership 
••^M Chapter 1. General and Limited Liability Partnerships (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Partnership 
§ 48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), all partners are liable: 
(a) jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under 
Sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11. 
(b) jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership, except a 
partner may enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnership contract. 
(2)(a) A partner in a limited liability partnership is not liable, directly or 
indirectly, including by way of indemnification, contribution or otherwise, for a 
debt, obligation, or liability chargeable to the partnership arising from 
negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct committed while the partnership is 
registered as a limited liability partnership and in the course of the partnership 
business by another partner, or an employee, agent, or representative of the 
limited liability partnership. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a partner in a limited liability 
partnership is liable for his own negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct. 
Laws 1921, c. 89, § 15; Laws 1994, c. 61, § 3. 
Codifications R.S. 1933, § 69-1-12; C. 1943, § 69-1-12. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
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Uniform Law 
This section is similar to § 15 of the Uniform Partnership Act (1914) . See Volume 
6, Pt. I Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Partnership ^-^ 165. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 289kl65. 
C.J.S. Partnership §§ 167 to 168. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
ALR Library 
115 A.L.R. 1362, Constitutionality, Construction, and Application of Statutes Which 
Forbid or Otherwise Regulate Compensation for Organizing Corporation, Procuring 
Subscription for Stock, or Selling Its Securities. 
Forms 
19 Am. Jur. Pi. & Pr. Forms Partnership § 13, Statutory References. 
Alabama Corporation Law with Forms § 1:20, The Limited Liability Partnership. 
19 Am. Jur. Pi. 5 Pr. Forms Partnership § 13, Statutory References. 
24 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 145, is the Limited Liability Partnership Now 
the Entity of Choice for Delaware Law Firms? 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
BNA Health Law & Business Series No. 2200 § 2200.03, Formation of Joint Ventures. 
Limited Liability Companies: Tax and Business Law 15.02, Registered Limited 
Liability Partnerships. 
SC7 6 American Law Institute-American Bar Association 1, Substantive Partnership 
Law: Special Problems of General and Limited Partnerships. 
SB85 American Law Institute-American Bar Association 1, Substantive Partnership 
Law: Special Problems of General and Limited Partnerships. 
CA86 American Law Institute-American Bar Association 1, Substantive Partnership 
Law: Special Problems of General and Limited Partnerships. 
937 Practising Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 149, 
Organization and Operation of the Limited Liability Company: Substantive Issues. 
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937 Practising Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 237, 
Limited Liability Entities for Law Firms. 
869 Practising Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series 355, 
Organization and Operation of the Limited Liability Company. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Agency relationship J3 
Assets of individual partners £ 
Award 18 
Bankruptcy 11 
Corporations J* 
Derivative action _1 
Dismissal 14 
Evidence of joint ventures 16 
Failure to comply with statutory requirements 10 
Fiduciary nature of relationship 2 
Individual liability 1_ 
Insurance companies £ 
Interest 1_9 
Joint and several liability 5_ 
Laches L3 
Parol evidence 15 
Requirements of partnership £ 
Service 12^  
Sufficiency of evidence 1/7 
_1. Derivative action 
In stockholder's derivative action, stockholder must maintain a claim not for 
himself or any stockholder or any creditor but solely for the corporation. Bergeson 
v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 19_ 
€^> 
S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Corporations ^-^ 202 
In stockholder's derivative suit for benefit of corporation, evidence sustained 
finding that requirements of rule governing secondary actions by stockholders were 
satisfied. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 23(b), 28 U.S.C.A. Bergeson v. Life Insurance 
Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 
U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Corporations ^"^ 212 
Even though corporation was damaged by acts and omissions of officers and alleged 
promoters resulting in its authorization to act as stock life insurance corporation 
without capital and surplus required by Utah law, whatever improprieties there may 
have been did not result in legal injury to corporation and there could be no 
recovery in stockholder's derivative suit for benefit of corporation on basis of 
such improprieties. U.S.A.1953, 31-11-1. Bergeson v. Life Insurance Corporation of 
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America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 
L.Ed.2d 1545. Insurance ^ ^ 1151 
2_. Fiduciary nature of relationship 
Man who was neither an officer nor a director of corporation at time of stock 
issuance would not be held liable for balance due on stock on theory of liability 
because of a breach of a fiduciary duty. Bergeson v. Life Insurance Corporation of 
America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 
€^> 
L.Ed.2d 1545. Corporations ^ ^ ^ 307 
Corporate officers and directors have a fiduciary or quasi fiduciary relationship 
to corporation requiring them to act loyally and m good faith without assuming any 
position in conflict with interests of corporation and promoters must act fairly 
and honestly in their dealings with corporation. Bergeson v. Life Insurance 
Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 
U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Corporations ^ ^ 30(2); Corporations ^ - ^ 307 
3_. Corporations 
A corporation necessarily acts vicariously and can acquire knowledge only through 
its officers and agents and their knowledge is knowledge of corporation. Bergeson 
v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 7_9 
S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Corporations ^ ^ 428(1) 
_4. Requirements of partnership 
On question whether profits shared should be regarded merely as wages, it is 
important to consider degree to which a party participates m management of the 
enterprise and whether the relationship is such that the party shares generally in 
potential profits or advantages and thus should be held responsible for losses or 
liability incurred therein. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-12. Cutler v. Bowen, 1975, 543 P.2d 
1349. Partnership ^ ^ 9(1) 
5_. Joint and several liability 
In derivative action by stockholder of life insurance company against directors, 
who allegedly caused company to issue capital stock to themselves without company 
receiving anything of value, to recover market value of stock, liability of 
directors was joint and several, rather than several and not joint, where right of 
recovery was based primarily on fraud of directors in acting both as directors and 
members of partnership, which organized the company, and which received stock from 
company, and which distributed stock to directors. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-10, 48-1-12. 
Bergeson v. Life Ins Corp of America, 1958, 170 F.Supp. 150, affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 
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L.Ed .2d 1545 . I n s u r a n c e ^ ^ 1151 
_6. Insurance companies 
Where original contributions by partnership were noted in books of mutual insurance 
corporation as contributed surplus on understanding that, at such time that mutual 
corporation became a stock corporation, stock would be issued to partnership, 
advances were not loans but were in effect stock subscriptions and acceptance of 
benefit of advances carried with it obligation to issue stock therefore at such 
time as the corporation was in position to take such action and to extent that 
stock was issued with a market value not exceeding value of cash advanced and 
equipment furnished it by partnership, it was paid for by the partnership. 
Bergeson v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari 
denied 79 S. Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Insurance ^ - r r ^ ~ H60 
2- Individual liability 
Member of partnership may because of membership, be held individually liable for 
partnership obligation incurred within scope of partnership business. Prows v. 
srship -^^  It Hawley, 1928, 72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31. Partners ^ ^ 165 
J3. Agency relationship 
Where plaintiff, with full knowledge that partnership had been granted option to 
buy realty, entered into agency agreement with one of the partners, whereby partner 
agreed to negotiate for purchase of the same realty, that any instruments executed 
should be executed in his individual name, and that he would assign all rights he 
might acquire to his principal, and where the agency agreement made no mention of 
the previous option, the agency agreement gave plaintiff no valid contractual right 
to purchase the realty under the option agreement, and was not binding on 
partnership. Cummings v. Jorgensen, 1971, 25 Utah 2d 274, 480 P.2d 466. 
€^r Partnership ^-^ 173 
9_. Assets of individual partners 
Partnership debts and obligations must be satisfied by partnership assets to extent 
any exist before creditor can seek satisfaction from individual assets of 
partnership. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-12(2). McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell Telephone, 
1988, 758 P.2d 914. Partnership ^ ^ 187 
10. Failure to comply with statutory requirements 
Members of partnership which received benefit of stock issued to partnership were 
liable under theory of quasi contract for partial failure of consideration paid by 
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partnership for stock and in view of fact that partners had failed to comply with 
Utah Limited Partnership Act, they were liable as general partners and were jointly 
and severally liable therefor. U.S.A.1953, 48-1-12, 48-2-2. Bergeson v. Life 
Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 
1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Partnership > * X ~ ~
 3 6 2 
Utah law to effect that an insurer shall not pay to any person, who has power to 
decide which insurance applications shall be accepted or rejected, any compensation 
related to income upon such risks except upon net profits therefrom was violated by 
agreement between insurer and partnership to pay partnership overriding commissions 
on all insurance written where members of partnership were officers and directors 
of insurer and had power to accept or reject risks and partnership was not entitled 
to be issued stock of insurer in consideration for overriding commission on 
insurance written by partnership. U.C.S.1953, 31-7-10. Bergeson v. Life Insurance 
Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 
U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Insurance ^-^ 1151 
11. Bankruptcy 
For preference purposes, transfers from Chapter 11 debtor general partner to 
debtor's partnerships to pay debt was for benefit of "creditor," where guarantor of 
debts under Utah law had contingent right to payment against debtor general 
partner. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(4) (A), (9) (A), 547 (b), (b) (1), 550 (a) (1); 
U.C.A.1953, 48-1-12(2), 48-2-9. In re Granada, Inc., 1990, 115 B.R. 702, reversed 
156 B.R. 303. Bankruptcy ^S**™' 2611 
12. Service 
Failure to serve general partner who was jointly, rather than jointly and 
severally, liable on debt precluded renewal of judgment against him, but did not 
affect renewal of judgment against two general partners who were served. 
U.C.A.1953, 48-1-12. Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 1990, 800 P.2d 795. Judgment 
^•^ 868(2); Partnership ^-^ 375 
13. Laches 
Defense of laches is primarily addressed in trial court. Bergeson v. Life 
Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 
1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Equity ^ ^ 84 
14. Dismissal 
A judgment of dismissal pursuant to a stipulated settlement is ordinarily a 
judgment on the merits barring another action for the same cause. Bergeson v. Life 
Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 
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1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Judgment X ^ ~ ~ 570(6) 
Where Utah court on stipulation entered judgment dismissing action brought by 
director against the company to recover unpaid director's fees and judgment stated 
that action together with any possible counterclaims relating thereto was dismissed 
with prejudice, such judgment was res judicata in subsequent stockholder's 
derivative suit wherein it was alleged that director and others in violation of 
their fiduciary duty as corporate officers and directors issued company stock 
without consideration even though judgment was entered without approval of 
stockholders, in view of fact that state court had jurisdiction of parties and of 
subject matter and had power to enter judgment, and claim of lack of corporate 
power, in absence of stockholder action, should have been addressed to Utah court 
and at most it was a collateral attack on judgment and could not be made in federal 
court. Bergeson v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, 
certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Judgment ^ ^ 
828.9(5) 
15. Parol evidence 
Parol evidence rule rendered inadmissible, in action to collect on note signed by 
general partner for limited partnership, allegations concerning alleged prior oral 
agreement providing that general partner would not be personally liable on the 
note; loan documents were clear on their face and contained no provision stating 
that general partner would not be personally liable on the note. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-
12, 48-2-9. First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Felger, 1987, 658 F.Supp. 175. 
c^> Evidence ^ ^ 459(2) 
16. Evidence of joint ventures 
Real estate agent's receipt of $2,000 from general contractor was a share of the 
profits and was prima facie evidence that he was a joint venturer; owners 
testified that agent told them he was general contractor's partner, had met with 
them and general contractor several times and had gone beyond normally expected 
real estate agent activities by assisting with ordering of materials for job site. 
U.C.A.1953, 48-1-3.1, 48-1-10 to 48-1-12. Hoth v. White, 1990, 799 P.2d 213. 
^•^ 1.1! Joint Adventures 
17. Sufficiency of evidence 
In suit by operator of tavern business against owner of equipment, furnishings and 
inventory of such business to recover one-half of $10,000 sum paid by city 
redevelopment agency as compensation for disruption of the business on theory that 
operator and owner were engaged in a partnership, evidence warranted findings that 
value of the going concern and goodwill belonged to the parties as partners in the 
enterprise, that the $10,000 sum paid by agency was compensation for loss due to 
forced relocation of business and thus that parties were entitled to equal shares 
of such sum. U.C.A.1953, 11-19-23.3 et seq., 48-1-1 et seq., 48-1-4, 48-1-12, 48-
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U.C.A. 1953 §48-1-12 
1-15 (1) , 48-1-37, 57-12-1 et seq. Cutler v. Bowen, 1975, 543 P.2d 1349. 
Partnership ^-^^ 53; Partnership X ^ ^ w w 336(3) 
18. Award 
Compensation award against partnership held unauthorized, where claim was made 
against individual partner only, without notice to or appearance by other partners. 
Comp.Laws 1917, §§ 6510, 6511, 6520; Laws 1921, c. 89, §§ 13-15; Comp.Laws 1917, § 
3110, as amended by Laws 1919, c. 63. Palle v. Industrial Commission, 1932, 79 
Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222. Workers' Compensation >*•- 1 7 7 1 
Compensation award against partnership on claim against individual partner, without 
indication in pleadings demand was against him as partner, held invalid as to 
individual partner. Comp.Laws 1917, § 3110, as amended by Laws 1919, c. 63. Palle 
v. Industrial Commission, 1932, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222. Workers' 
€=>„ Compensation ^-^ 1776 
Compensation claim for injuries held not within statute rendering partnership 
members jointly and severally liable, but within statute imposing joint liability, 
so as to make award against partnership on claim against individual partner 
invalid. Laws 1921, c. 89, §§ 13-15; Comp.Laws 1917, § 3110, as amended by Laws 
1919, c. 63. Palle v. Industrial Commission, 1932, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 
ion ^ ^ 177* A.L.R. 1222, Workers' Compensat  
19. Interest 
Where members of partnership and directors of corporation were jointly and 
severally liable for difference between value of shares of stock issued to 
partnership and sum which represented cash plus value of furniture and equipment 
furnished, interest would be allowed and computed on basis that stock for which 
there was failure of consideration was last stock issued to partnership. Bergeson 
v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, 1959, 265 F.2d 227, certiorari denied 7_9 
€=> 
S.Ct. 1452, 360 U.S. 932, 3 L.Ed.2d 1545. Interest ^-^ 21 
U.C.A. 1953 § 48-1-12, UT ST § 48-1-12 
Current through 2007 First Special Session including laws passed at the 
2007 November General election. 
Copr © 2007 Thomson/West 
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a 9007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Exhibit 4 
Wfestlaw. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 
Page 1 
C Westfs Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
Part III. Pleadings, Motions, and Orders 
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading 
time before a responsive pleading is served or, I 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action h 
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 2 
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be 
requires. A party shall plead in response to an 
remaining for response to the original pleading o 
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the 
otherwise orders. 
once as a matter of course at any 
f the pleading is one to which no 
as not been placed upon the trial 
0 days after it is served, 
leave of court or by written 
freely given when justice so 
amended pleading within the time 
>r within 10 days after service of 
longer, unless the court 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not r 
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they 
all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Su 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time 
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the tri 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it 
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadin 
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserve 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission 
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon 
court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the 
meet such evidence. 
aised by the pleading 
shall be treated in 
ch amendments of the 
evidence and to raise 
, even after judgment; 
al of these issues. 
is not within the 
gs to be amended when 
d thereby and the 
of such evidence 
the merits. The 
objecting party to 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to 
the date of the original pleading. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable 
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading 
setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the 
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even 
though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or 
defense. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the 
supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
ling ^ * 229 to 273, 427. 
Limitation of Actions ^"^ 127, 124. 
Parties ^ " ^ " ^
 54<r 6 2 m 
Pleadd 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 302k229 to 302k273; 302k427; 241kl27; 241kl24; 
287k54; 287k62. 
C.J.S. Architects § 39. 
C.J.S. Damages § 223. 
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §§ 228 to 231, 235. 
C.J.S. Parties §§ 76 to 7_8, _8£, 1_£8 to 153. 
C.J.S. Pleading §§ 323 to £75, 8_22^ , _82_4, 858. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
ALR Library 
59 A.L.R. 2nd 169, Amendment of Pleadings to Assert Statute of Limitations. 
Forms 
Am. Jur. PI. St Pr. Forms Pleading § 225, Procedural Rules References. 
Am. Jur. Pi. & Pr. Forms Pleading § 284, Procedural Rules References. 
Am. Jur. Pi. & Pr. Forms Depositions and Discovery § 3, Procedural Rules 
References. 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
Amended and supplemental pleadings, see FRCP Rule 15. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Amendment of pleadings, 
Amendment of pleadings to add party, simultaneous amendment of judgment 
imposing liability against party, due process, right to notice and hearing, 
see Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., U.S.Ohio2000, 120 S.Ct. 1579, 529 U.S. 460. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 
C West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
Part VII. Judgment 
RULE 54. JUDGMENTS; COSTS 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any 
order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of 
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments 
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's 
initiative; and, unless otherwise directed by the court, a judgment shall not 
include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more 
than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by the 
court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the 
entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order 
or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other 
form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by 
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; 
and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights 
of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
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(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind 
from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a 
statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an 
appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than 
costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide 
the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its 
officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after 
the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, 
a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the 
action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating 
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have 
been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with 
the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or 
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served 
and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in 
any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it 
was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk 
must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case 
where not included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in 
the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register 
of actions and in the judgment docket. 
[Amended effective January 1, 1985; November 1, 2003.] 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Arbitration in third party motor vehicle accident cases, costs set forth in 
this rule, see § 31A-22-321. 
Final or interlocutory appeals, see Rules App. P r o c , Rule 5. 
Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, arbitration, see §§ 31A-22-305 
and 31A-22-305.3. 
Verified memorandum of costs, see Rules Civ. P r o c , Form 23. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
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State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*i 
Part VI. Trials 
RULE 52. FINDINGS BY THE COURT 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the 
advisory jury, the court shall find the fac 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment sh 
granting or refusing interlocutory injuncti 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
action. Requests for findings are not nece 
of fact, whether based on oral or documenta 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard sh 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
to the extent that the court adopts them, s 
the court. It will be sufficient if the fi 
are stated orally and recorded in open cour 
appear in an opinion or memorandum of decis 
need not enter findings of fact and conclus 
except as provided in Rule 41 (b) . The cour 
statement of the ground for its decision on 
50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion i 
facts without a jury or with an 
ts specially and stare separately its 
all be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in 
ons the court shall similarly set forth 
which constitute the grounds of its 
ssary for purposes of review. Findings 
ry evidence, shall not be set aside 
all be given to the opportunity of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, 
hall be considered as the findings of 
ndings of fact and conclusions of law 
t following the close of the evidence or 
ion filed by the court. The trial court 
ions of law in rulings on motions, 
t shall, however, issue a brief written 
all motions granted under Rules 12 (b), 
s based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend 
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial 
pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court 
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has 
made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a 
motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Except in actions for 
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an 
issue of fact: 
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(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered m the minutes. 
[Amended effective January 1, 1987.] 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Injunction -^^  152, 156. 
it ^ - ^ 200. 
il "^^  : 
Judgment 
Tria ^ ^ " 388, 393 to 400, 405. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 388k388; 388k393 to 388k400; 388k405; 228k200; 
212kl52; 212kl56. 
C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 219 to 231, 24Q. 
C.J.S. Judgments § 49. 
C.J.S. Trial §§ 1073 to 1082, 1085 to 1086, 1093 to 1118, 1135 to 1138. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Forms 
Am. Jur. PI. & Pr. Forms Trial § 491, Procedural Rules References. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
I. IN GENERAL 1-70 
II. REVIEW 71-140 
I. IN GENERAL 
<Subdivision Index> 
Actions and proceedings where necessary, duty to make findings £ 
Additional findings 37 
Administrative adjudications 2_ 
Amendment or correction of findings or conclusions 3_5 
Conclusions of law £ 
Conclusiveness and effect, construction and operation 43 
Conformity to pleadings, issues and proofs 20-26 
Conformity to pleadings, issues and proofs - In general 20 
Conformity to pleadings, issues and proofs - Evidence improperly admitted 
24 
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NOTICE OF FILING COMPLETED TRANSCRIPT 
To: Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
Date: Januaiy 30, 2007 
Re: Appellate Court # 20070029 -SC 
Trial Case No. 060900323 
Williams v. Stags Car Club 
Notice is hereby given that the following transcript will be mailed for filing with the Second 
District Court in Ogden, Utah January 31, 2007: 
Motion to Dismiss November 1, 2006, 
Sincerely, 
Carolyriferickson, CSR 
801-5234186 
cc: 
Jacque M. Ramos 
Moriarity Budaruddin & Booke 
(In transcript) 
Lauri Shingle 
Managing Court Reporter 
(In Transcript) 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON WILLIAMS, et aL, 
Plaintiff, 
STAGS CAR CLUB, et aL, 
Defendant 
Case No. 060900323 PI 
Appellate Case No. 20070029-SC 
With Keyword Index 
MOTION TO DISMISS NOVEMBER 1, 2006 
BEFORE 
HONORABLE ERNEST W. JONES 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
, \*j> 
\ 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: JACQUE M. RAMOS 
Attorney at Law 
For the Defendants: DAVID M. CONNORS 
MELINDA MORGAN 
MICHAEL K. WOOLLEY 
CLIFFORD J. PAYNE 
DAVTD R. HAMILTON 
MARK R. ANDERSON 
GARYL.DOEHLING 
DANIEL McConkie 
Attorneys at Law 
INDEX 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Ms. Morgan 
Mr. Woolley 
Mr. Connor 
Ms. Ramos 
p« 
3, 
,30, 
11, 
age 
27 
8 
32 
31 
RULING 33 
1 reasonable inferences for those under Utah rules allow the 
2 Motion to Dismiss to be denied. Defendant's Motion to 
3 Dismiss and joinders thereof should be denied because 
4 plaintiffs have properly alleged two theories of liability; 
5 one, vicarious liability of a for profit joint venture or 
6 partnership qualifications under the law that does hold other 
7 members of that partnership vicariously liable for the 
8 tortuous acts of another member while acting within the scope 
9 of that partnership. 
10 And number two, that their individual participation 
11 in managing and overseeing that event is sufficient enough 
12 for an allegation to hold those members directly liable for 
13 those acts or failure to act in assuming the duty under rhe 
14 law to maintain a reasonable safe premises of rhose events. 
15 In the worst case scenario today in which that 
16 plaintiff's allegations are unambiguously certain to be 
17 interpreted to include that individual participation among 
18 the members, the plaintiffs in the alternative request the 
19 Court to grant leave to amend to make those allegations 
20 certain and clear. 
21 That's all I have. Thank you Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: All right, thank you Ms. Ramos. 
23 Ms. Morgan, any response? 
24 MS. MORGAN: Just a few. First of all I just want 
25 to be clear. There as a lot of discussion about discovery 
27 
1 enterprise which is where Mr. Ramos would like to go. That 
2 allegation is not contained in the complaint, Your Honor. 
3 Nor is there any allegation in the complaint to bolster what 
4 Ms. Morgan has already said and Mr. Woolley. Nor is there 
5 any allegation in the complaint that any individual other 
6 than Mr. Wiggins or that the club, acting somehow m a 
7 collective capacity, instructed Mr. Wiggins to get into his 
8 car and move it that day when the unfortunate accident 
9 occurred. The absence of that allegation, Your Honor, there 
10 is no basis to impose individual liability on any one 
11 individual member of the club. 
12 THE COURT; All right. Anybody else, do I dare 
13 ask? 
14 Again, I appreciate the arguments from all the 
15 parties and I appreciate all the briefs and memorandums but 
16 Mr. Ramos, I admire what you're trying to do but I just don't 
17 think I can let this fly. I'm going to grant the Motion to 
18 Dismiss as to all of the defendants except, of course, Mr. 
19 Wiggins. It just seems the bottom line, the only person who 
20 was really actively involved in committing this tort which is 
21 backing over or running over your client is Mr. Wiggins and I 
22 just think it's too much of a stretch to try to impose any 
23 kind of liability against all of the members of the Stags Car 
24 Club - it's almost a tongue twister to say. 
25 J I don't know if I need to make specific findings 
33 
1 but it seems to me from reading the briefs, it appears to me 
2 that the Skags Car Club is an unincorporated nonprofit social 
3 club and that's what I got out of reading the briefs and it 
4 also appears to me that all of the defendants are individual 
5 car members or the car club and it seems the law is very 
6 clear that individual club members of an unincorporated, 
7 nonprofit social club cannot be held liable for the 
8 negligence of a club member, Mr. Wiggins, simply by virtue of 
9 their status as members of the club. 
10 Again, I just don't see that there's any duty here 
11 by the members of the car club to supervise or keep a 
12 lookout. It seems to me from looking at the briefs that the 
13 plaintiff in this case, Ms. Williams was a licensee, she's 
14 not an invitee. She wasn't there for a business deal so it 
15 seems to me that her category would be one of a licensee 
16 rather than an invitee. I just don't find that the 
17 defendants, these car club members were ever acting in 
18 furtherance of the tort. There's just no indication the club 
19 was acting for pecuniary gain in this particular case based 
20 on what I saw in the briefs. Again, I don't find there's any 
21 dangerous condition that existed and probably most important 
22 I don't find that the defendants were the possessors of the 
23 land even if there was a dangerous condition. They were 
24 simply renting that property out to hold a steak fry. 
25 So anyway, based on that, I'm going to grant the 
34 
1 motion. I just thought this case, this Orser vs. George was 
2 right on point. There were a number of other cases that also 
3 talked about that same premise but it just seemed to me that 
4 case just kind of jumped out at me and again, it's not enough 
5 I don't think to say, well, these people all belong to the 
6 car club, they were all actively involved in the steak fry, 
7 therefore there's liability. I think it has to focus on 
8 somehow they have to be actively involved in the tort itself. 
9 They have to be doing something that led to the injury to Ms. 
10 Williams and just belonging to the car club and just paying 
11 dues and just bringing your steak or potluck or whatever, I 
12 just don't think that's enough to impose any kind of 
13 liability but I do Ms- Ramos, I do admire what you were 
14 trying to do. There's always a new theory out there on 
15 liability and I don't blame you for pursuing that but anyway, 
16 I'll grant the motion. 
17 Does somebody want to prepare an order based on 
18 what I've just said? Ms, Morgan. 
19 MS. MORGAN: I will, Your Honor. 
20 MS. RAMOS: I have one clarification just to ask 
21 you. 
22 THE COURT: All right. 
23 MS. RAMOS: In the fact that the decision to grant 
24 the Motion to Dismiss was (inaudible) and your findings to 
25 the Stag Car Club itself in that and they're still, this 
35 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Uti SiUyf! 
SHARON WILLIAMS and 
LYNN WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STAGS CAR CLUB, et al., 
Defendants. 
1
 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND 
FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
RULE 54(b) 
Civil No. 060900323 
Judge Emest W. Jones 
Defendants Jim BurkdoU, Devm Ellis, Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page, 
Don Palireyman, and Jim Vowles' Motion to Dismiss, which was joined by all defendants who 
are club members, except Ralph Wiggins, came on for hearing before The Honorable Ernest W. 
Jones on November 1, 2006, at 10:30 a.m. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, Jacque 
M. Ramos of MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE; defendants Jim BurkdoU, Devin Ellis, 
Scott Hammon, Gary McDaniel, Ray Page, Don Palfreyman, and Jim Vowles were represented 
by their counsel, Melinda A. Morgan of RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON; 
defendants Greg Warg and BJ. Burkdoll were represented by their counsel Michael K. Woolley 
of RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON; defendant Ralph S. Wiggins was represented 
by his counsel Clifford J. Payne of NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & PAYNE; defendant 
Brent G. Bodily was represented by his counsel Mark R. Anderson of WILLIAMS & HUNT; 
defendant Mack White was represented by his counsel Daniel S. McConkie of KIRTON & 
MCCONKIE; defendants Stags Car Club, Adam Christofferson, Craig Christofferson, Jack 
Harris, Bruno Perry, and John Elwess represented by their counsel David M. Connors of 
CHAPMAN & CUTLER; defendant Brent Keyes was represented by his counsel Gary L. 
Doehling of DOEHLING & DRISCOLL; and, defendants Dennis Bench, Robert Eames, Mickey 
Ellis, Jerry Fulmer, Dale Hammon, Mike Howell, Dave Squires, Bruce Woolsey, Ryan Woolsey, 
Bill New, and Scott New were represented by their counsel David R. Hamilton of DAVID R. 
HAMILTON, P.C. 
The court, having reviewed the pleadings in this matter, having heard oral 
argument thereon, and otherwise being fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following 
ruling. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that: 
1) in their Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, plaintiffs fail to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted against all defendants who are club members, except Ralph 
Wiggins, since they fail to plead that these members acted in furtherance of the tort which 
harmed plaintiff; 
2 
2) the above-entitled action be, and the same is hereby, dismissed with prejudice 
against all defendants who are club members, except Ralph Wiggins; 
3) this Order of Dismissal serves as a Final Judgment, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to all defendants who are club members, except Ralph 
Wiggins, since there is in jint i vison for delay, arid thi court hereby expressly directs that an 
entry of Final Judgment be entered for these defendants; and, 
4) two defendants still amain m this case. Ralph Wiggins and Stags Car Club 
DATED this 3 ^ day of /*V^E Y^ . 2006. 
BY THE CoURl 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS 1 U I (>RM 
MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN, & BOOKE 
JACQUE M. RAMOS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was hand-delivered on this / ^ d a y of November, 2006, to the following: 
Bradley L. Booke 
Jacque M. Ramos 
MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN 
& BOOKE, LLC 
341 South Main Street, Suite 406 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Gary L. Johnson 
Michael K. Woolley 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & 
NELSON 
50 S. Main Street, #700 
P. O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465 
Attorneys for Greg Warg and BJ Burkdoll 
and that it was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this same day, to the following: 
David R. Hamilton 
DAVID R. HAMILTON, P.C. 
3434 Washington Boulevard, Suite 202 
Ogden,UT 84401 
Attorneys for Dennis Bench, Robert Fames, 
Mickey Elks, Jerry Fulmer, Dale Hammon, 
Mike Howell, Dave Squires, Bruce 
Woolsey, Ryan Woolsey, Bill New, and 
Scott New 
David M. Connors 
James K. Tracy 
Jennifer A. Brown 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP 
201 South Main Street, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Stags Car Club, Adam 
Christofferson, Craig Christofferson, Jack 
Harris, Bruno Perry, and John Elwess 
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Kiimen L. Taylor 
HUTCHISON & STEFFEN, LLC 
2484 West 7200 North 
P. 0. Box 91 
Honeyville, UT 84314 
Attorneys for Jimmxe Germer 
Daniel S. McConkie 
KTRTON & McCONKTE 
60 E. South Temple. #1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120 
Attorneys for Mack White 
Clifford J. Payne 
NELSON CHIPMAN QUIGLEY & PAYNE 
215 S. State Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Ralph S Wiggms 
Gary L. Doehling 
DOEHLTNG & DRISCOLL. P.C. 
628 Rood Avenue. Suite 3 
Grand Junction, CO 81501 
Attorneys for Brent Keyes 
Carolyn Stevens Jensen 
Mark R. Anderson 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Attorneys for Brent G Bodily 
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